Table of Contents

Introduction: 1. An overview of chapter 1: the institutional economics of taxation; 2. A presentation of the model; 3. An overview of chapter 2: positive economics; 4. An overview of chapter 3: normative economics of taxation; 5. An overview of chapter 4: normative economics of taxation: further issues; 6. An overview of Chapter 5: the political economics of taxation; 1. Institutional economics of taxation: 1.1. Introduction; 1.2. The model; 1.3. Allocation via game forms; 1.4. Tax systems versus game forms; 1.5. More on game forms versus tax systems; 1.6. Coming back on the anonymity assumption; 1.7. Conclusion; 1.8. Bibliographical note; 2. Positive economics: the structure of tax equilibria; 2.1. The basic model; 2.2. The local structure of the set of tax equilibria; 2.3. The global structure of the set of tax equilibria; 2.4. Positive economics: tax equilibrium and tax incidence; 2.5. Bibliographical note; 3. Normative economics of taxation: reform and optimization; 3.1. Tax reform, the canonical argument; 3.2. Tax reform: a closer examination of specific situations; 3.3. Tax reform: from infinitesimal to finite changes-algorithms of tax reform; 3.4. Tax reform - further discussions; 3.5. Second-best Pareto optima; 3.6. Bibliographical note; 4. Normative economics of taxation: further essays on optimization and reform; 4.1. The social values of commodities; 4.2. Non-linearities and quotas policies; 4.3. Optimal taxes and tax reform in a one-consumer economy; 4.4. Mixing linear and non-linear taxation; a bird's eye view; 4.5. Bibliographical note; 5. Political economics of taxation; 5.1. Introduction; 5.2. The structure of the set of Pareto optimal tax equilibria; 5.3. Taxation as a social choice or a game theoretical problem; 5.4. A one-dimensional version of the taxation game; 5.5. Further remarks on the one-dimensional taxation game; 5.6. Bibliographical note; Conclusion; Mathematical appendix; Bibliography; Index.