Read an Excerpt

CHAPTER 1

HARRY TRUMAN

Korean War, 1950

Bold Action, Overreach

President Harry Truman's housekeeper, Vietta Garr, announced that dinner was ready. Truman, his wife Bess, and daughter Margaret walked to the dining room of their home in Independence, Missouri. It was 6:30 p.m. on Saturday, June 24, 1950, and Missouri's summer heat had prompted Vietta to open most of the windows in hopes of catching an evening breeze. The first family had escaped from the Washington merry-go-round for what they hoped would be a restful weekend respite.

After dinner, Truman began to tire and talked of going to bed early. The peaceful evening suddenly ended when the hall telephone jangled. Dean Acheson, Truman's secretary of state, was calling from his home in Maryland.

"Mr. President," he said, "I have very serious news. The North Koreans have invaded South Korea."

Acheson briefed the president on available details and recommended that the State Department seek a cease-fire resolution from the United Nations Security Council. Truman readily agreed. The president then asked if he should return immediately to Washington, and Acheson counseled against that, primarily because he did not know the extent of the aggression. Further, Truman's unscheduled return might unnecessarily prompt public anxiety. But that didn't stop apprehension from affecting the Truman family "None of us got much sleep that night," Margaret recalled later. "My father made it clear from the moment that he heard the news, that he feared this was the opening round of World War III."

The next morning, Truman asked Bess and Margaret to act as if nothing had happened. The two women went to church, and the president and his Secret Service escort made a previously scheduled visit to the family farm in nearby Grandview. When he returned home, a military aide gave him a cable with bad news from John Muccio, the US ambassador to the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea).

IT WOULD APPEAR FROM THE NATURE OF THE ATTACK AND MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS LAUNCHED THAT IT CONSTITUTES AN ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE AGAINST ROK. MUCCIO

Shortly after noon, Acheson called again with updates and confirmed the action to be a full-scale invasion. Truman responded forcefully: "Dean, we've got to stop the sons of bitches no matter what."

Truman decided on the spot to return to Washington. His aides hustled to get the plane and crew ready for departure within an hour. At the Kansas City Airport, just ten miles from the Truman home, reporters besieged the president and his party with questions about wire reports on Korean hostilities. The president's physician, Brigadier General Wallace Graham, responded to New York Times writer Anthony Leviero and Time's Edwin Darby, "The boss is going to hit those fellows hard."

While Truman and his party prepared to board the president's plane, Independence, a modified Douglas DC-6 airliner, his family, who remained behind, watched silently from the tarmac. "Mrs. Truman was calm but serious," Leviero reported that night. "She looked much as she appeared on the fateful evening of the late President Roosevelt's death."

During the three-hour flight to Washington, Truman solidified within his mind his initial impulse to confront the North Koreans. The appeasements in Europe and Asia in the 1930s shaped his thinking. "Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier," Truman wrote in his memoir. He also surmised that if the North Korean aggression went unchecked, the communists would target other countries. "If this was allowed to go unchallenged, it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war." Throughout his political career, Truman prided himself for trying to do the "right" thing, and he believed that a strong response was just that.

The president had his staff radio ahead to Acheson, asking that he assemble the top civilian and military leaders at Blair House for a dinner meeting. The central part of the White House, including the family quarters, was undergoing extensive repairs, so the first family was living across Pennsylvania Avenue in the chief executive's official guesthouse.

At 6:00 p.m., the UN Security Council passed a Korean cease-fire resolution, which also called for all member countries to withhold any assistance to North Korea. The vote was 9-0, with Yugoslavia abstaining. The Soviet representative, Jacob Malik, was not present. He had been boycotting Security Council meetings since the previous January in protest of the Council's refusal to replace one of its members, Nationalist China, with Communist China. Malik's absence surprised US diplomats, but unknown to them, Soviet general secretary Joseph Stalin had personally directed Malik's inaction. Later revelations have disclosed that Stalin knew that acting under the UN umbrella would limit possible American escalation. The United States would need to keep its allies within the coalition and thus refrain from overly aggressive operations.

Independence landed at National Airport at 7:15 p.m., and Acheson, Undersecretary of State James Webb, and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson were there to meet Truman. As they drove downtown in the president's limousine, Acheson briefed Truman on the UN action. While exiting the limo, Truman demonstrated the resolve he had formulated that morning and aboard Independence: "By God," he declared, "I'm going to let them have it!"

At Blair House, several assistants from State and Defense joined Acheson and Johnson, as well as the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Omar Bradley, and the three service chiefs. Missing was Averell Harriman, Truman's newly appointed assistant for foreign policy. The former ambassador to the UK and Soviet Union was in London on a personal visit. The president asked the men to withhold all substantive matters until after dinner.

Chief White House butler Alonzo Fields and his tuxedo-clad assistants served the fourteen men a dinner of fried chicken, shoestring potatoes, asparagus, tomatoes, hearts of lettuce, dessert, and coffee. Once the butlers had cleared the table and retreated, Truman stated that he wanted to focus that evening on immediately needed decisions. He then turned the meeting over to Acheson, the tall and aristocratic representative of the Eastern Establishment.

Secretary Acheson began with what he termed a "darkening" report of situation in Korea and then covered the early diplomatic developments. The taciturn Bradley spoke next and immediately hewed to Truman's hard line: "We must draw the line somewhere." But the chairman, a steely World War II combat commander, questioned the advisability of committing US ground units. Army chief General Joe Collins, Army secretary Frank Pace, and Secretary of Defense Johnson interjected, agreeing that US actions should be limited to air and sea power.

General Bradley continued speaking and assessed the possibility of a Soviet escalation to global war. Noting that the Soviets had yet to recover from World War II, he asserted, "Russia is not yet ready for war." Air Force chief General Hoyt Vandenberg, who agreed that the US must stop the North Koreans, disagreed and said the group should not "base our action on the assumption that the Russians would not fight."

That statement prompted Truman to ask about the strength of Soviet naval and air forces in the Far East. The respective service chiefs gave thumbnail sketches of the capabilities and numbers, with Vandenberg mentioning that the Soviets based large numbers of jet aircraft near Shanghai, China. Truman then asked, "Can we knock out their bases in the Far East?"

"It might take some time," Vandenberg replied. He then mentioned an issue that would arise again during the crisis, "It could be done if we used A-bombs."

The subject then turned to the military chain of command in Asia. Johnson noted that General Douglas MacArthur was the commander of US Army forces in the Far East and the likely candidate to lead the US defense of South Korea. MacArthur had accepted the Japanese surrender to end World War II and had stayed in Tokyo as the commander of US occupying forces. Secretary Johnson spoke of appointing MacArthur to handle the military side of the crisis, but urged caution because of MacArthur's well-known propensity to follow only his own counsel. "Instructions to General MacArthur," Johnson said, "should be detailed so as not to give him too much discretion." Truman said nothing at this point but was well aware of the general's haughty and arrogant demeanor. The president had previously referred to MacArthur as "Mr. Prima Donna" and a "stuffed shirt."

By the end of the meeting, Truman had formally decided to confront the North Koreans militarily, but only under the auspices of the UN. Until Acheson could gain a UN resolution to provide that authority, the president ordered several preparatory actions: MacArthur was to resupply South Korean forces and send a survey group to Korea to assess the hostilities; provide air cover for the evacuation of Americans; reposition naval forces; create contingency plans for the destruction of Soviet Far East air bases; and assess the next potential targets for Soviet expansion. He also banned both explicit statements and background comments to the press until he spoke publicly in two days. The president closed with an invitation: "Now let's all have a drink. It's been a hard day."

Truman had committed to repulse the North Korean invasion even if it meant war, but he turned contemplative after the first bourbon. "I have hoped and prayed that I would never have to make a decision like the one I have just made today," he said. "But, I saw nothing else that was possible for me to do except that."

A Secret Communist Plan

Cold War historian John Gaddis, writing about the Korean War in 1997, noted in general terms how seemingly unrelated events proceeding along parallel tracks had converged all at once with results that had been unpredictable. More specifically, Gaddis added, "... What is striking about the Korean War is the extent to which its outbreak, escalation, and ultimate resolution surprised everyone."

Upon the defeat of Japan in World War II, the Soviet Union accepted the surrender of Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel of latitude and occupied that part of the Korean peninsula; the United States took control south of the line. The Soviets installed a communist government in the north, led by Kim Il-sung. He had been a resistance leader during the Japanese occupation and a major in the Soviet Red Army during World War II. Kim led the creation of the People's Republic of Korea in 1948 and became prime minister. In the south, Syngman Rhee, a US-backed anticommunist, was elected the first president of the Republic of Korea. Kim and Rhee wanted to unify the country, but only on their individual terms. Those ambitions created a potentially explosive dynamic, which prompted both sides to mount cross-border raids prior to 1950.

Neither Rhee nor Kim, however, could successfully invade the other side without support from their superpower sponsors. In the case of North Korea, this meant that any thoughts of invading the South had to fit into Stalin's overall plan for communist expansion. Many in the West believed at the time that Stalin exercised rigid control over all communist states, although such hegemony was far from complete. What Truman and his advisers didn't know was that in early 1950, Stalin concluded the time was right for a possible move by Kim. The West had stymied communist expansion attempts in Europe through the formation of NATO's collective defense, and the Marshall Plan's economic rebuilding efforts helped strengthen Western Europe. Further, the 1948–1949 US airlift to an isolated West Berlin in communist East Germany showed Stalin the West's resolve. In Asia, however, the communist forces led by Mao Zedong had taken control of China in 1949 and pushed their opponents, the Nationalists, offshore to the island of Formosa. Perhaps another Asian nation could be next. Stalin was also emboldened by the development of his own atomic weapons, and if a Korean initiative prompted a US-China war, the conflict would give him time to increase Soviet military strength. The United States added to Stalin's expansionist thinking by withdrawing its military from South Korea in 1949. But the clincher for Soviet action came from an oversight by Acheson.

While speaking at the National Press Club in Washington on January 12, 1950, the secretary of state described the American "defense perimeter" in the Western Pacific. He inadvertently left Korea and Formosa (now Taiwan) off the list of countries that the US military would protect. Already primed for communist expansion in Asia, Stalin quickly approved a plan by communist China's chairman Mao Zedong to invade Formosa, and he entertained Kim's proposal for forceful Korean reunification. Kim pressed his case personally when he visited Moscow in April and gave Stalin assurances that "America would never participate in the war. We are absolutely sure of this."

Stalin conditionally approved Kim's invasion, pending approval by Chairman Mao. "If you should get kicked in the teeth," Stalin told Kim, "I shall not lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for all the help."

Kim, the grandfather of North Korea's current ruler, traveled to Peking (now Beijing) in April while the Soviet general staff prepared detailed war plans for the North Korean military. Kim exaggerated Stalin's support when he approached Mao and said that he would not need Chinese help. The Chinese gave Kim a green light, and Mao, focusing on preparations for attacking Formosa, appeared thereafter to pay little attention to Kim's war preparations.

President Truman knew nothing about the secret coordination between Stalin, Mao, and Kim. While Truman's advisers assumed Moscow's control of China and Korea, they misjudged the readiness of Stalin and Mao to intervene, and the forcefulness of that intercession. That intelligence deficit and the resulting misjudgment yielded a potentially disastrous trap.

The Commander in Chief Acts

On Monday, June 26, the day after Truman returned to Washington, MacArthur cabled bad news. "Tanks entering the capital city of Seoul ... South Korean units unable to resist determined Northern offensive ... Our estimate is that a complete collapse is imminent." Truman immediately met with his advisers that evening at Blair House. He decided to beef up US forces in the Philippines, increase aid to Indochina, another potential communist target, and to commit US air and naval forces in support of the South. However, the president banned operations above the 38th parallel. Both Bradley and Acheson remained skeptical about introducing US ground troops, and Bradley counseled, "Let's wait a few days."

The president and his Blair House crisis team met with congressional leaders on the 27th in the White House West Wing. The delegation fully supported the president's actions thus far and agreed that Truman could act under his authority as commander in chief and did not need a congressional resolution. However, this approval from the Capitol Hill leadership didn't extend throughout the ranks. Robert Taft (R-Ohio), a frequent critic of Truman, spoke up on the Senate floor the next day. He said that he would have voted for a resolution, but Truman needed congressional approval to send aid to South Korea. Taft, who often faulted Acheson as the source of America's international problems, also pointed to "the bungling and inconsistent foreign policy of the administration." Taft called for the secretary of state's resignation.

At his weekly news conference on June 29, the president told reporters that American military aid to South Korea would help the republic maintain its independence. Truman refused to talk about sending US ground troops or comment on the possible use of atomic bombs, which he had employed in Japan to end World War II in Asia. At one point, however, a reporter asked, "Mr. President, everybody is asking in this country, are we or are we not at war?"

"We are not at war," Truman responded tersely. After an exchange about what Truman labeled a "bandit raid" by North Korea, another reporter angled back toward the nature of America's possible military actions. "Mr. President, would it be correct, against your explanation, to call this a police action under the United Nations?"

"Yes. That is exactly what it amounts to."

Some have viewed as a mistake Truman's acceptance of a journalist's words to describe the conflict. However, in the circumstance, Truman wanted to avoid a congressional declaration of war given the scant five years since the last one; the police term handily fit his strategy. But the exchange did fit a pattern he had established during his regular dialogues with the press. Acheson later reflected on Truman's extemporaneous conversations with reporters: "He was not good in the fast back-and-forth of a press conference. President Truman's mind is not so quick as his tongue." Truman often responded to a question before a reporter finished it and trapped himself with an off-kilter answer. "This tendency was a constant danger to him," Acheson wrote, "and bugbear to his advisers."

---

Excerpted from "Presidents in Crisis"
by .
Copyright © 2015 Michael K. Bohn.
Excerpted by permission of Skyhorse Publishing.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

---